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Comparative Law-Its Functions,
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Max Rheinstein ° *
Let me thank you heartily for your invitation and for the
opportunity to talk to you about a field of legal learning which
has held my attention for more than forty years, the field of
comparative law. Even though its functions, methods and usages
may not be entirely familiar to legal practitioners and scholars
of even high professional achievement, I think I can assume that
it is generally known that comparative law has something to
do with the world outside of our own country, that it is concerned with law not as the legal system of the United States of
America or of Canada, or France, or any other single country,
but that it is concerned with law as a supra-national phenomenon.
The University of Arkansas is an apt place to discuss such
a phenomenon of supra-national significance. It was through a
former president of this university, J. W. Fulbright, now distinguished Senator from Arkansas and Chairman of the Senate's Committee on Foreign Relations, that American studies of
world affairs have received a decisive impetus and that a host of
lawyers, American and foreign, have been enabled to engage in
studies of comparative law. Your speaker has been one of those
who, under the Fulbright scheme, has gone to work and to
teach law in countries East of the Atlantic and West of the
Pacific Ocean, and to whose own university here in the United
States the Fulbright scheme has year by year brought the
stimulating company of foreign students and foreign colleagues.
*

An address delivered at the University of Arkansas School of

Law, March 13, 1968.
** Professor of Comparative Law, University of Chicago.
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What have we Fulbright scholars and Fulbright students in
law been doing when we work in comparative law? 1 What, indeed, is comparative law? I shall answer these questions by
taking you through those successive stages through which one has
to go if he is engaged in work of comparative law.
The first stage for each comparatist must be the study of
his own law. No American can be a comparatist before he has
gone through a full course of training in American law. This
proposition may seem to be self-evident. ; Apparently, it is not
self-evident to all the makers of American law school curricula.
In an increasing number of American law schools we can find
courses on comparative law as part of the curriculum that
leads to the regular academic degree in American law. Most of
these courses are properly placed in that curriculum. It can
only be to the good of the future American lawyer when at
least once during his study of American law he is made aware
of the fact that outside of the United States laws are different,
and that our ways of administering justice are not the only
possible ones. It will also be stimulating for him to obtain a
survey of the legal systems that can be found in the various
parts of the world. But a more ambitious effort to teach details of a foreign legal system, or worse, of several of them, to
an American student who is not yet at home in his own law,
cannot be anything but a road to dangerous confusion.
Comparative law, in its second stage requires the study of
some foreign law. But which of the legal systems which are
presently in force in the world shall be studied? In a sense each
of the 132 sovereign countries now existing has its own system
of law. In fact, several countries have more than one system.
Here in the United States each of our fifty states has its own
law, in addition to the federal law. In the United Kingdom,
the law of Scotland differs from that of England. In Lebanon
each of the sixteen recognized religious communities has its
own law and its own court.
Fortunately, all these different laws can be grouped in
families whose members are, more or less, all linked to one
single mother law, and which thus tend to resemble each other to
a more or less considerable extent. The two principal groups
are those of the common law and the civil law. The common
law family is that which has its common origin in the law of
England. Of that large family our own law is a prominent
member, along with the laws of such countries as Eire, Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, India, Nigeria, Kenya, or Fiji. Of
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course, these laws differ from each other. The rules and institutions of present American law are not the same as those
of England or Ontario. In India or Pakistan those branches of
the law which are concerned with the family have been shaped
by Hindu or Moslem religious traditions. In the former British
parts of Africa disputes arising out of that rapidly dwindling
part of native dealings which is still carried on in traditional
native ways are still to some extent judged by native customs.
But in spite of all divergencies a lawyer from the United States
can without much difficulty carry on a meaningful conversation
with one from England, Zambia, New South Wales or any other
common law country. They have all been brought up in the
same tradition, they use the same basic concepts, their minds
tend to operate along the same paths.
But let an American lawyer carry on a conversation with a
colleague from France, Mexico, Germany, or Japan and he is
likely to find himself caught in a maze of confusion. Even if
both speak English, he is likely not to understand what his
partner is talking about or, even worse, he will misunderstand
him. His partner has been brought up in a different mode of
thinking, of approaching problems, of looking at the sources in
which the rules of the law are supposed to be expressed. In
fact, a lawyer from Germany or Switzerland may not find it easy
to converse with a colleague from France, Italy or Argentina.
All the civil law systems are conglomerates of medieval European customs and the learning about Roman law that, after
having been lost with the fall of the Roman Empire, was rediscovered in the twelfth century. But the customs were different in different parts of Europe. That fact accounts for some
differences. Others, more significant ones, are due to the fact
that the complex mixtures were reduced to systematic codes
which were made at widely different times. The oldest, that
of Denmark, was promulgated in 1683; the latest ones, those of
Greece, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Portugal, Syria and a number of
African countries, date from recent years. Of these codifications two have served as models for most of the others, the
French Civil Code of 1804 and the German Civil Code of 1896.
The latter, being almost a century younger, is both more refined
and more expressive of modern needs and ideas. One who has
worked his way into the legal system of France should be able
without much difficulty to get along in those of Belgium, the
Netherlands, Spain, Chile, the Congo, or Viet Nam. The student
of German law should encounter little difficulty in under-
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standing the laws of Switzerland, Turkey, Japan, Korea, Scandinavia or any one of the socialist countries of Europe, even though
the last named ought to be understood, as far as content is concerned, as expressions of the political and economic tenets of
Marxism.
Among all the legal systems of the world we thus distinguish
between the two great families of the common law and the civil
law, and within the latter the two groups of the French and the
German patterns. An American comparatist will thus have
to acquaint himself with the legal system of France or Germany
or both. He will then hold the key to any other legal system to
which he may feel himself attracted by professional need or by
inclination.
Familiarity-please note that I do not say acquaintancewith at least one of the principal foreign systems constitutes the
indispensable basis for comparison. But what do we compare?
On the most elementary plane we can compare rules and institutions of different laws. On that plane it is irrelevant whether
the several laws belong to different families or systems or to
the same.
We may, for instance, compare what steps must be taken to
establish a corporation under the laws of Arkansas, Illinois, England, France and Ghana, or what formalities are required under
these laws for the effective execution of a will, or how to
initiate and conduct a law suit.
Such comparison may be of practical importance in advising
a client, and it may not be easy to carry on. The investigator
has to know where to find the materials and how to read
them. That may not be possible without acquaintance with the
particular country's legal system as a whole. The mere reading
of a statute or a treatise, or even worse, of a translation, may
be thoroughly misleading.
More sophisticated is the comparison of legal terms and concepts. "Mortgage" is a word of the English language. Can it be
used as a translation of the French word "hypoth~que"? The
two terms seem to be equivalent, but on closer investigation it
turns out that, while they have a common core, they have different fringes. Is the English term "consideration" equivalent
to the French term "cause"? The answer is again: to some
extent yes, to others no. Does "marriage" or what goes as its
equivalent in another language mean the same in the legal
systems of the United States, Italy and the Soviet Union?
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Even words of the same language may have different
meanings in different legal systems. Until 1938 the German
words "scheidung" and "trennung" had different meanings in the
legal systems of Germany and Austria. In the law of Germany
"scheidung" meant divorce and "trennung" meant separation
from bed and board. The Austrian terminology was the opposite.
Incidentally, the person who in English and American law is
called "plaintiff," is called "pursuer" in Scots law.
Problems of this kind can be crucial in the translation of a
statute, a judicial opinion, an international treaty, or a business
contract. The attorney who advises an American firm in negotiations with a firm abroad must know in what meaning a
legal term appears in the framework of a foreign system, and he
must be loath to assume that it can always be rendered by
simply translating it into what may be believed to be its equivalent in American legal parlance.
Of even greater complexity is the comparison of what I shall
call "approaches." Let me explain what I mean. In every legal
system of the world, or at least in every modern system, contractual promises are enforced. If Mr. Borrower has taken a
loan for $1,000, promised to repay it on January 1, 1968, and
fails to do so, the creditor can go into court. If he proves the
facts he will be given judgment and if Borrower still fails to
pay, the sheriff will come and levy execution on the television
set or the farm, or Borrower's bank account or claim for wages
may be garnisheed. If Borrower tries to resist, the sheriff or
his deputies will break the resistance with force and, if necessary, may call out the posse or the National Guard or the Armed
Forces of the United States.
The enforcement, or the threat of enforcement, in this literal sense is a necessity in a society in which the economic
system is based on credit. But shall every promise be enforced
through the full might and power of the government? People
make all sorts of promises: "I'll see you for lunch next Monday";
"I'll drop your letter in the mail box"; "We'll follow up the civil
marriage ceremony with one in church." A man may promise to
pay a gangster $10,000 if he puts away his wife, or to provide a
counterfeiter with a printing press, etc. No court anywhere will
enforce such promises. In that respect, American, French, German and probably all other laws are in agreement. But in what
terms is the refusal to be articulated? American courts are
likely to talk about consideration, its lack or its illegality;
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French courts will talk about "cause"; German courts use no

such over-all term but resort to several different categories.
In what respect do these techniques differ? Why do they
differ? Which is most likely to achieve socially desirable results?
In every legal system it is taken for granted that one who has
been illegally injured by another is entitled to receive damages. But when is an injury "illegal"? Nobody doubts that a
motorist who has driven through a red light at eighty miles an
hour and has smashed into another car has acted illegally. But
what about the drug company which has manufactured a new
tranquilizer and has observed the traditional precautions, but
the children of thousands of mothers who have taken the drug
are born deformed? Should the firm be liable if it has continued
selling the drug after receiving some information indicating
that there might possibly be some dangerous effects? To what
extent, if at all, may business firms try to maintain prices by
such devices as retail maintenance schemes? Should a person
who has entered public life be entitled to damages if a newspaper has published some damaging information about him
which turns out to be false?
American law approaches such problems in a fashion similar to those of the criminal law. Just as a criminal code enumerates and defines those acts which, and which alone, subject a
person to punishment, Anglo-American law has developed a
catalogue of torts the commission of which subjects the actor to
the duty to pay damages. So we have such torts as trespass,
assault, battery, negligence, libel, slander, unfair competition,
malicious prosecution, conversion and whatnot. The definitions
are, of course, not one hundred percent precise. Cases occur
where it is not clear whether or not they fall within any of
these pigeon holes. Then the courts must come in and, as time
goes on, a body of case law grows over the skeleton of the several torts. But the skeleton is still there as the bones from
which the courts have to start in their deliberations.
French law, to be more exact, the French Civil Code, pursues a different technique. Exactly one section of the 2,281 of
which it is composed tells the courts under what circumstances damages are to be awarded for a tort. Article 1382
states: "Every human act which causes harm to another obliges
the one through whose fault it has occurred to pay damages".
That provision is devoid of meaning until it is given meaning by the courts. The French law of tort has thus developed
as a body of case law, leaving to the courts a freer reign than
HeinOnline -- 22 Ark. L. Rev. 420 1968-1969
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that given to them in Anglo-American law, which, as popular
theory has it, is a pure case law, but where, in fact, the courts
are guided, often closely, by traditions of long standing. How
can we account for this strange phenomenon that in the field of
torts in France, the very prototype of a code country, the courts
have more freedom than in countries of the common law,
and that an intermediate position is occupied by the law of
Germany? How do these different approaches work out in actual practice? Which has proved itself to be best suited to do
justice? Which is the best to allow the adaptation of the law to
the continuous changing circumstances of life?
We are led to the more comprehensive question of defining,
explaining and evaluating these various ways of articulating the
law in different legal systems. What indeed differentiates a
codified law from a case law? Does codification have the same
effects at all times and at all places? Do California lawyers
use their code in the same way French lawyers use theirs?
Does a French lawyer of 1968 treat his code the same way it
was treated in 1804? What has become of the German code when
it was used as a model in Japan and Korea, or of the Swiss Code
when it was transplanted to Turkey?
And what about cases? They play an enormously important
role in France, Germany and other civil-law countries. But are
they handled in the same ways everywhere? Here we meet the
most crucial, but also the most subtle problem of comparative
law. What is the difference between the ways in which the
legal mind works, the attitudes a judge or an attorney takes
when he is confronted with a problem? The ways of the
common-law mind are different from those of the civil-law
mind. When a European-trained, young lawyer comes to the
University of Chicago for graduate study, I invariably tell him:
"Try to forget that you have ever studied law. Never approach
a problem in the way in which you would approach it at home.
You are likely to go astray." This prescription is not easy to
follow. But when it has been followed and the American way
of legal thinking has been grasped, the student will make a
discovery: In the field of private law some eighty percent of all
cases come out alike, irrespective of whether they come up in
a court in the United States, in Canada, in France, in Argentina
or in Japan. After all, our civilization is a unit, the problems
are the same and so are the solutions. But the common base
shows variants: the American, the German, the Spanish, etc.
They account for the twenty percent different decisions, and for
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the differences in the methods of legal thought. To explore
both the common base and the variations, their causes and their
results is a task full of fascination.
In no small measure are the variations of legal thought and
method the result of differences in the machinery of the administration of justice and in the training and the personality
make-up of the personnel. Common law procedure is modeled
upon the premise that the case will be tried to a jury. Much of
our substantive law has been developed by appellate courts in
the shape of decisions determining whether a certain question
is for the jury or for the judge. This fact has given a peculiar
tinge to much of our substantive law. It has largely been responsible for the detail into which such broad standards as reasonable care, constructive notice, or contributory negligence have
been broken down. Jury trial has also been the cause for the
development of a special law of evidence, which as law students have discovered, is one of the most complicated. Jury trial
also has produced a peculiarly flamboyant style of advocacy and
peculiar techniques of trial tactics. In civil-law countries trial
by jury is a rare exception in criminal cases and never used at
all in civil matters. Instead, we there find various kinds of
mixed bench composed of both career judges and laymen. The
latter are partly experts in commercial affairs or representatives of groups such as employers and employees, or, especially in
criminal cases, they are average lay people just like American
jurors. But they sit together with the professional members
of the bench and deliberate together with them all questions of
fact, of law, of damages, or of punishment.
In all the countries of both the common law and the civil
law, procedure, civil and criminal, is of the adversary nature.
But in the civil-law countries, the powers of the judge are more
comprehensive, and they are even stronger in the socialist
countries. While we believe that the true state of facts can be
found out most effectively in the process of examination and
cross-examination conducted by the parties' attorneys, civilians,
and even more so Soviet jurists, believe in the likelihood of the
truth being found out better through the judge's active participation in the examination of witnesses and in the entire
conduct of the case.
Comparison of the roles played by judges and lawyers in
the conduct of law suits, the preparation of legal documents and
the counseling of clients shows that the occupants of offices in
the administration of justice do not everywhere harbor the
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same images about their functions. A German or French
judge, not to speak of one in the Soviet Union, is more likely to
conceive of himself as a functionary of the government than an
American judge, who is easily inclined to look at government as
the Leviathan against whom the citizen must be protected. How
have such different attitudes developed? What reflections can
be found in the law of differences in legal education, in selection for judicial office, in social origin of. law people?
The problems that present themselves for comparison are
innumerable. For some the answers can be found easily by
anyone who has gone through the not-so-easy task of working
his way into a foreign legal system. But most of the problems
are complex and subtle, and compel the comparatist lawyer to
dig into history, to engage in studies of economics, anthropology or sociology, or to establish working relationships with colleagues from these disciplines. But what are we to do with the
results of our endeavours? Of what use are they, if any?
Being a professor, I would state first the usefulness our
insights have in and by themselves. They are answers, mostly
tentative ones, to man's insatiable quest for knowing his world.
They are as valuable or as useless as the insights obtained in such
sciences as comparative religion, comparative linguistics, biology
or physics. They simply satisfy our curiosity.
But the insights of the theoretical sciences have been put
to practical uses. Medicine is based on biology, technology on
physics and chemistry. In law, international practice is based
upon comparative law. The American lawyer who wishes to
advise an American client in matters such as export-import
deals, international transportation, supra-national financing, or
doing business abroad need not be an expert in every detail of
the foreign law involved. But he should know its basic institutions. Above all, if he is successfully to negotiate with a foreign
partner or through a foreign lawyer, he must understand the
foreign legal mind. He ought to know how it operates, how arguments are made, what terms are used and what they mean.
Results can easily be disastrous if the American lawyer naively
assumes that his foreign colleague thinks and argues in the
ways to which he is accustomed, or that he uses terms in the
same sense in which they are used in American legal parlance.
Not so obvious, but at least as helpful, is the suggestive
force of foreign law for the handling of one's own. Time and
again I have been told by former students of the Chicago Foreign
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Law Program that it has opened for them new vistas of
American law. If considered in its familiar American context,
a client's case may look desperate. But familiarity with a foreign law frequently brings to the mind an approach which, while
unusual in the American framework, can nevertheless serve as
an effective argument.
But the most obvious use of comparative law within the
framework of national law is in the field of law making, judicial
and legislative. In most countries of Europe it is common practice in the preparation of any major legal reform to engage
in extensive study of foreign ideas and experiences. In the
preparation of the family law reform that is presently in progress in the Canadian Province of Ontario, extensive studies are
utilized of recent developments in the United States, Scandinavia,
Germany and other countries. Recently I participated in a conference in Louisiana in which, for purposes of a comprehensive
reform of the private law, papers were presented on foreign challenges and experiences, and a course of extensive studies will
be undertaken in that state in its newly established Institute
of Civil Law Studies. In New York the Law Revision Commission, and in England the Law Commission, are constantly engaged in studies of comparative law. Nobody, of course, intends
simply to enact a statute that is found to work successfully in
some other part of the world. But suggestive ideas can be
derived from it and equally so from foreign experiments that
have failed. Why, indeed, should one repeat what has turned
out to be a mistake elsewhere?
I hope I have suggested to you that comparative law is a
field of practical utility and, above all, one that is full of intellectual challenge. I hope at least some students of law may
ask the question of how to get there. There are several avenues, all of which have one common presupposition. Any one
who wishes to engage in comparative law work, must know
languages. The very minimum is a complete reading knowledge
of French, or German, or preferably of both. Better is a knowledge of additional languages, such as Spanish, Russian or Chinese.
Familiarity with foreign law may be obtained either through
trial and error, i.e., actual work in a law firm engaged in international practice. A better way is that of systematic study.
The American law graduate may go to France or Germany for
study there. He will find that two years is the minimum and
that the first year is likely to be wasted. The organization of
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legal studies is so different from ours that an American student
is likely to be lost unless he is individually guided. And how is
he to find such guidance?
Besides, even if he thinks he
knows the language, he will have trouble in following lectures,
participating in discussions and writing term papers.
A few American law schools have therefore followed the
example of the University of Chicago and established special
programs of training in French, German, or other foreign law
such as Soviet, Latin-American or Chinese. These programs are
arduous. Admission requires language facility and an eminent
academic record.
My work in the law extends over fifty years. I have been
fascinated by it and I am still fascinated. I have found fascination when I once worked in German law, and again when I have
been working in American law. But the greatest fascination
and the greatest intellectual satisfaction has been found in
comparative law.
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